On July 27 and 28, 2025, the United States and the European Union presented a framework agreement that establishes a general 15% tariff on European exports to the U.S. and maintains higher tariffs on sensitive sectors such as steel and aluminum. The European Commission described it as a measure to stabilize relations and avoid tariff escalation, while the White House called it a "reciprocal, fair, and balanced" agreement.
One of the most controversial points is energy. According to data from Eurostat and the International Energy Agency, in 2024 the United States supplied 45% of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) imported by the EU, and in the first quarter of 2025, the share rose to 50.7%. The joint declaration mentions Europe's intention to increase US energy purchases to $750 billion by 2028, but specialists such as CEPS and Bruegel warn that this figure is unrealistic and will depend on prices, infrastructure, and climate goals.
In terms of defense, the agreement does not establish specific purchasing obligations. NATO had previously agreed at its June 2025 summit in The Hague that allies would allocate up to 5% of GDP to defense by 2035. Countries such as Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands had already confirmed purchases of F-35 aircraft, while France and Spain opted to strengthen their European programs such as the Rafale and Eurofighter. Poland, for its part, has accelerated its acquisition of Abrams, HIMARS, and Patriot aircraft since 2022, with strong US participation. These decisions reflect national policies and NATO commitments, not the commercial framework.
The country analysis shows a diverse picture: Germany combines F-35 purchases with LNG energy contracts; France maintains industrial autonomy in defense and diversified energy contracts; Italy expands its F-35 program and regasification terminals; the Netherlands increases its F-35 fleet within NATO; Spain strengthens the Eurofighter and becomes a regasification hub; Poland rearms with a strong US presence in its arsenal. None of these moves are directly mandated by the EU-US agreement.
European bodies such as the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade) emphasize that the July-August 2025 framework is political and requires implementation in accordance with the internal procedures of the EU and its Member States. Think tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), SIPRI, and Bruegel point out that rather than a surrender of sovereignty, it is a strategic realignment to gain predictability in trade, strengthen energy security, and increase defense spending under NATO parameters.
Possible scenarios include: 1) a partial and flexible implementation of energy and trade commitments; 2) litigation or tensions if the US imposes more unilateral tariffs; and 3) a selective intensification in digital areas, critical supply chains, and investment controls. In all cases, arms and energy purchases will continue to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis and subject to national decisions.
In conclusion, although the trade framework has been interpreted as a negotiation under pressure, official European evidence indicates that there are no legal obligations for massive arms or energy purchases from the US. What does exist is a context of greater energy dependence and a commitment to increase military spending in Europe, where each country defines its own mix of US, European, and other allied suppliers.